fruits, but because we were deceived in the estimate which we formed of it. In short, human observation expects and finds, that the law of causality reigns among the wishes of the heart and the purposes of the mind, as it reigns in every other department of the soul.

By far the most formidable objection to all this is that which is thought to be found in the consciousness, an appeal to which is made with great force by Cousin, by Sir W. Hamilton, and by Tappan in his treatises on the will. It is affirmed by these authors, that we are led by consciousness to observe, that our volitions have no cause, We meet this assertion with a direct negation. We have endeavoured to unfold the full revelation of consciousness, but we maintain that it does not, that it cannot carry us the length of discovering that volitions have no cause. This is a subject on which consciousness considered in itself says nothing, and can say nothing. It may testify in regard to the existence or non-existence of such or such a mental state, but it can say nothing directly as to its being or its not being necessarily connected with some other phenomenon, and that possibly lying out of the field of consciousness. In order to discover whether there be such a connexion we must resort to other processes, when we find that the intuitions revealed by consciousness, as well as the observations founded on consciousness, lead us to believe that the will itself, with its special actings, like every other phenomenon, must have a cause.

But while there are laws of the will, we are not to regard them as laying any restraint upon it. This would be a complete misunderstanding of their nature. They no more lay restraints upon the will, than the fundamental laws of reason and conscience trammel these faculties in the discovery of what is true and what is virtuous. A truthful mind may be incapable of sanctioning

falsehood, and an honourable mind may be incapable of designing a mean action; but this is not because of any stern necessity controlling the will, but because of the very nature of the will itself. A person of an opposite spirit may be quite as incapable of conceiving of a generous action, and this not because of any restraint laid upon the will, but because of the inward depravity of the will. These laws, which are just the rules of the action of the will, the rules which it adopts, do in no way interfere with the